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In addition to what has been said about Mr. McCone, we had full cooperation from the intelligence chiefs of the Department of Defense and different services. We found that they, too, had rendered very fine service.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Senator from Mississippi a question. If he has already answered it, I apologize, because I was unable to be present during the delivery of his previous remarks.

I, for one, was hopeful that the committee would be able to fix responsibility in the so-called Cuba buildup and indicate to us whether this was due to a slip-up in our intelligence systems or a slip at the policy- or decision-making level. I wonder if the Senator could tell me whether the interim report of the committee attempts to go into that question.

Mr. STENNIS. The report will speak for itself on that point. I do not mean to give the Senator a short answer, but that matter is covered, so far as the report goes into it, as clearly as possible. As the Senator from Massachusetts said, we did not go into final conclusions or recommendations. It is largely a factual report, with some observations indicated therewith.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senate will indulge me briefly, I wish to bring up some nominations. They have been cleared with the committees and the minority leadership. The time taken will be short.

Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business to consider executive reports of committees submitted today.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to consider executive business.

CONVENTION CONCERNING THE EXCHANGE OF OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS AND GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS—REMOVAL OF INJUNCTION OF SECRECY

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the majority leader has asked me to ask unanimous consent that the injunction of secrecy be removed from Executive G, 88th Congress, 1st session, a Convention Concerning the Exchange of Official Publications and Government Documents, together with a certified copy of a procès-verbal relating thereto, and a certified copy of the Convention Concerning the International Exchange of Publications, signed at Paris on October 18, 1960, transmitted to the Senate today by the President of the United States, and that the conventions and message from the President be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the President's message be printed in

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The message from the President is as follows:

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a certified copy of the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Official Publications and Government Documents Between States, together with a certified copy of a procès-verbal relating thereto, and a certified copy of the Convention Concerning the International Exchange of Publications. Both of the conventions were adopted by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization at Paris on December 3, 1964, and the procès-verbal was signed at Paris on October 18, 1960.

I transmit also the report made to me by the Secretary of State regarding the aforesaid conventions and procès-verbal.

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 9, 1965.

(Enclosures: (1) Report of the Secretary of State; (2) certified copy of Convention Concerning the Exchange of Official Publications and Government Documents Between States; (3) certified copy of procès-verbal; (4) certified copy of Convention Concerning the International Exchange of Publications.)

AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS TO FILE REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT, WITH INDIVIDUAL VIEWS, DURING ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I ask unanimous consent that the committee be allowed to file a report on the International Coffee Agreement, 1962, with individual views, during the adjournment of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMPTROLLER OF CUSTOMS

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Frank H. Tuohy, of New Jersey, to be Comptroller of Customs, with headquarters at New York, N.Y.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Leland J. Hayworth, of New York, to be Director of the National Science Foundation for a term of 6 years.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Arnold Ordman, of Maryland, to be General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board for a term of 4 years.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE

The legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations in the Public Health Service.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that those nominations be considered en bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nominations will be considered en bloc; and, without objection, they are confirmed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask that the President be notified immediately of the nominations confirmed this day.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the President will be notified forthwith.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

A NATIONAL EMERGENCY ON CIVIL RIGHTS

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, first I wish to express my gratitude to the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Douglas) who, with his customary courtesy, has allowed me to proceed him in recognition. I shall not take very long.

I wish to address the Senate on the question of what has been occurring in Birmingham, Ala. Whether or not there has been a momentary suspension of the situation there, the Nation is facing a mounting crisis over racial relations, equality of opportunity, and the safeguarding of civil rights. It is critically important that this time be utilized to the full before something else happens which could give us even worse difficulties and complicate further the effort to remove the causes of these shattering events.

While I respect the President fully in everything he is trying to do about the very difficult situation which he faces in Birmingham, I most respectfully dissent from the administration's view, expressed by the President yesterday, that situations such as has occurred at Birmingham, Ala., cannot be reached by Federal law. I believe they can be reached through the courts with general power in the Attorney General to sue to enforce the rights of U.S. citizens under the 14th amendment.

I believe another way to reach them, or to try to reach them, is through the present criminal laws. It can be done in the Federal courts under sections 241 and 242 of the United States Criminal Code, which make it an offense to deprive any citizen of his constitutional rights.

The civil right under the first amendment to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances has just been again restated by the Supreme Court of the United States in a case

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think that within itself it is a contribution with reference to this problem.

The subcommittee now consists of the Senator from Missouri (Mr. STANWELL), the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. THURMOND), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. HARTWELL), the Senator from Maine (Mr. BURR), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDSWORTHY), and myself; and I have the privilege of being the present chairman.

I invite attention of Senators to the secret report. It will be kept on file and accessible to any Member of the Senate or any Member of the House, so far as that is concerned, at the Committee on Armed Services and at the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, each of which is located on the second floor of the Old Senate Office Building. I commend the reading of the report to each Member of Congress. There are deletions, necessarily, of facts as well as comment thereon, from the report which went out to the press, but I think there is much solid matter in the report, so far as the material it proposes to cover is concerned.

Mr. President, while our investigation is not yet complete and will continue, the subcommittee has now filed with the Committee on Armed Services an interim report which is directed primarily to the military developments in that unhappy island and our intelligence activities and operations in connection with them.

The interim report, filed with our parent committee, was necessarily classified as "secret" since it contains information which, if publicly released, would have affected our national security adversely. However, consistent with our pledge to make all the facts public to the extent permitted by national security considerations, all of the facts and information contained in the report which can be made public under security regulations are now being released to the press and the public.

The subcommittee endeavored to make its interim report as factual as possible. When the evidence thus far presented to us was inadequate to enable us to arrive at definitive conclusions—as was true with respect to the number of Soviet troops now in Cuba and with respect to the question of whether concealed strategic missiles remain there—we have frankly said so. When deficiencies or inadequacies in our intelligence operations appeared, we have candidly pointed them out. In those cases where credit was due to our intelligence people, we have been equally candid.

I would like to discuss briefly some of the major findings of the interim report. As I have stated, it is directed primarily to our intelligence operations prior to, during and after the crisis last fall.

Mr. President, last October we stepped being confronted with operational, tactical mistakes on our very doorstep by a very narrow margin. We may be thankful indeed that our photographic reconnaissance last fall was able to

identify all strategic weapon systems in Cuba before they became fully operational and to spell out their locations and performance characteristics—all in a limited period of time and despite adverse weather and an almost completely closed society. At the same time, it is important to note that photographic reconnaissance has certain inherent limitations and that the absence of photographic confirmation of a report or reports does not necessarily mean that such reports are untrue. It is to be hoped that useful lessons have been learned from these facts.

From the testimony thus far presented, it appears to the subcommittee that a reasonably competent job was done by the intelligence community in acquiring and collecting intelligence information and data. We found also, however, that faulty intelligence evaluation of the data, coupled with the philosophical conviction of the intelligence officials that it would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba, resulted in some intelligence judgments and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous. A factor which contributed to the faulty evaluations was the tendency of the intelligence community to downgrade and discount the reports of Cuban refugees and exiles.

(At this point Mr. STANWELL took the chair as Presiding Officer.)

Mr. STANWELL. Mr. President, I do not mean to suggest they should accept everything which is said, but perhaps there has been a tendency to overdowngrade the reports of Cuban refugees. Perhaps that would be a more accurate way to state it.

A few of the instances of faulty intelligence judgment and evaluation deserve specific comment.

The evidence was undisputed that it was not until after a confirming picture was obtained on October 25, 1962—3 days after the President spoke to the Nation—that it was established by the intelligence community that organized Soviet ground combat units were indeed present in Cuba. While I will not comment on this fact at length, its importance should be obvious to all.

In addition, as the subcommittee report points out, the number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially underestimated by the intelligence community throughout the crisis. On October 22, 1962—the day the President spoke—our intelligence people estimated that there were 8,000 to 10,000 Soviets in Cuba, including civilian technicians. They now say that, at the height of the buildup last October, there were at least 20,000 Soviet troops on the island.

Despite numerous reports at that time, it was not until photographic evidence was obtained on October 14, 1962, that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles had indeed been introduced into Cuba. On this point it is also to the subcommittee's credit that the intelligence community was not misled by the comparatively small number of Soviet missiles which were actually launched. It was a great indication that our intelligence was being handled with the proper regard.

On the same point, the subcommittee found no evidence that there was a photographic gap between September 8 and October 14 and no factual support for the charges that prior to October 14 a conflict existed between Central Intelligence Agency and the Strategic Air Command which resulted in the transfer of the T-28 from CIA to SAC.

There was no conflict between there was a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding. Information from various sources, which I believe was due to some confusion or differences between the CIA and SAC. There was not a conflict of evidence to suggest that charges. To the contrary, all the evidence—positive strong, authentic evidence—was to the effect that there was the closest coordination, cooperation, and working together between them all the way through. There was no evidence of a conflict or a so-called gap.

We stepped closely into the many reports that strategic missiles and other offensive weapons are now concealed in Cuba in caves and elsewhere. All of the intelligence which expressed the opinion that all such weapons have been removed, but each readily admitted that, in terms of absolute, it is quite possible that some remain. Since absolute assurance on this question can come only from thorough on-site inspection by reliable observers which we have not had, there is reason for grave concern about this matter.

In this connection, the evidence disclosed that there are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns in Cuba and that many of these are suitable for the storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. Military activity has, in fact, been observed in connection with a number of these caves, but it is the view of our intelligence people that they are being utilized for the storage of military supplies and gear associated with the weapons we know to be in Cuba, and not for the storage of strategic offensive weapons. Admittedly, this judgment is based substantially on the negative evidence that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary.

Strategic missiles and weapons may it may not be in Cuba at this time. The absence of definitive evidence one way or the other at this point prevents the subcommittee from reaching a definite conclusion. However, the importance of establishing the facts about this matter cannot be overemphasized. The testimony established that it is possible and practical to conceal and store a substantial number of strategic weapons in Cuba in a state of readiness for use. The fact that these weapons and their associated personnel are in Cuba is a serious matter and should be given proper regard.

The evidence also indicates that the number of Soviet troops now in Cuba is substantially underestimated. The intelligence people were not misled by the comparatively small number of Soviet missiles which were actually launched. It was a great indication that our intelligence was being handled with the proper regard.

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1. The first step is to identify the problem. This involves understanding the current situation and the goals that need to be achieved.

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Furthermore, if my information is correct, what Mr. McCone has to deal with is an accumulation of intelligence estimates from other intelligence agencies, which he, because of his office, has to consolidate, synthesize, and make available to the National Security Council and, most especially, to the President.

No. 3 is:

3. Although photographic reconnaissance has limitations, it was this capability which ultimately produced incontrovertible proof of the presence of strategic missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba. Credit is due to those involved in this mission.

I am glad to know this point has been raised because questions have been raised about photographic reconnaissance. So the committee has performed a definite service in clearing up this matter.

No. 3 is:

1. While a reasonably competent job was done in acquiring and offering intelligence information and data, in retrospect it appears that several substantial errors were made by the intelligence agencies in the evaluation of the information and data which was accumulated.

Again let me say that this is to be expected. It is too bad that the errors were substantial, but we must allow a margin.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Senator from Montana is certainly correct in his statement in regard to allowing a margin for error. That is very clear when we see the mass of conflicting reports from human sources with which they have to deal and in regard to which they have to allow for as much self-interest. In addition, sometimes they receive contradictions from photographic sources.

Mr. MANFIELD. Yes.

Mr. STENNIS. That makes it almost impossible to know with certainty the exact location; or perhaps in checking, it is found that cloudy weather had intervened.

Mr. MANFIELD. Or that the photographs were made from a wrong angle.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. MANFIELD. In paragraph 4, the chairman of the committee and his committee have brought out the fact that on occasion the intelligence community has predisposition to evaluate opinion on the basis of what they think will happen rather than what the facts are.

I note that in subsection (b) of paragraph 4, the statement is made:

(b) The number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially underestimated throughout the crisis. On October 22, our intelligence people estimated that there were 8,000 to 10,000 Soviets in Cuba. They now say that, at the height of the buildup, there were at least 23,000 Soviet personnel on the island.

That statement can be related to one made several days ago by the distinguished Senator from New York (Mr. KENNEDY), in which he mentioned the fact that there were various figures, going up to 40,000, as shown in the report, and going down to 12,000, with 17,000, 22,000, and other figures in between. He referred to the situations as a sort of numbers game.

That is about the best way it could be stated. The chairman of the committee knows that, so far as the number mentioned by the President is concerned, that number was furnished to him. I would suppose, by Mr. John McCone, based upon the intelligence of all the intelligence communities, and was stated as an estimate and not an actual figure. Heads going back and forth cannot be founded; and an accurate figure, under any circumstances, could not be arrived at.

Mr. STENNIS. It is not really a "soft" figure, as that term is used in intelligence work. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MANFIELD. The chairman had cleared up that point.

In subsection (c) of paragraph 4 the following statement is made:

In reaching their pre-October 14 negative judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment as to Soviet policy and indications that strategic missiles were being installed were not given proper weight by the intelligence community. A contributing factor to this was the tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban refugees and allies.

I have two comments to make at this time.

First, I recall several meetings which the leadership attended with the President, the Chiefs of Staff, Mr. McCone, and other members of the administration.

When asked, Mr. McCone stated that every single bit of evidence which came to the attention of his committee, no matter from what source it had come—Cuban exiles or others—was looked into, and no bit of evidence was turned aside.

I repeat a statement in subsection (c): In reaching their pre-October 14 negative judgment—

If I remember correctly, the President was in Chicago. I see the Senator from Illinois is present in the Chamber. Perhaps he could state the date.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The speech in Chicago was on the night of Friday, October 13.

Mr. STENNIS. The President spoke to the Nation on the 22d.

Mr. MANFIELD. On October 14 the first pictures were shown. They were the first pictures which indicated what was taking place. They got into Washington on the 15th.

As soon as the President got the initial information on October 14 he ordered increased photographic reconnaissance, so he was absolutely sure of the information which Mr. McCone then presented to him on October 21 and 22. He then called the leadership back from different parts of the country, and the next day showed the pictures, blown up, which proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that missiles had been implanted in Cuba.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct.

To make the point clear, October 14 was the date that the picture which revealed so much was taken. It was blown in here on the 15th. Evaluation was started that night, which was Monday night. Certain evaluations, which

are a very minute process, of course, require some time. Then, as the Senator from Mississippi recalls, the President was "balled back." He was notified, of course, before that, but he turned back on Thursday or Friday.

Mr. MANFIELD. Mr. President, if the chairman will yield further, in paragraph 5, the committee states:

5. The committee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate charges and speculation about a photographic gap having existed from September 9 to October 14.

I am glad that the statement was made, because it answers various charges which have been made.

In subsection 6, the committee also sets at rest the report which has come to our attention from time to time about a conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Strategic Air Command.

Then in subsection 7 the committee states:

7. To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion that all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba. However, they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes—

I repeat that word "absolutes"—

It is quite possible that offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise.

That is a fair statement, if it is not misrepresented. No one can make a statement in a matter of this kind and be absolutely sure, as testimony given by Secretary McNamara and John McCone before various committees has proved. But that has been distorted by individuals from time to time to indicate that an absolute finding was made that there were strategic missiles and bombers yet in Cuba. I would only hope that the dissemination which the committee has brought out would be kept in mind.

Paragraph 8 refers to the fact that there are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns on the island of Cuba. That is known.

Mr. 8 raises a question but does not state a fact when it brings out the following:

8. Even though the intelligence community believes that all have been withdrawn it is of the greatest urgency to determine whether or not strategic missiles are now concealed in Cuba. The criticality of this is illustrated by the fact that, assuming maximum readiness at preselected sites, with all equipment preloaded, the Soviet mobile medium range (1,200 miles) missiles could be made operational in a matter of hours.

I repeat that only a question is raised at that point. It is not a statement of fact.

Mr. STENNIS. That is very clear. No. 8 is a way of saying that eternal vigilance is required and is absolute necessity.

Mr. MANFIELD. Exactly. Point again gets back to what the Senator from New York (Mr. KENNEDY) referred to several days ago as a "numbers game," concerning the number of Soviet troops and technicians in Cuba. As I have said before, and cannot repeat too often—I do this only to indicate the honesty of the President—when the President gives out figures time and time again

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I congratulate the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee for his fine work on the interim report. I also compliment the members of the committee and the staff who have worked hard on the report. I feel that the report is a good one. It is objective. It will be helpful to the people of the country to know exactly what the report contains.

It is my judgment that we cannot permit the Communists to remain in Cuba, only 90 miles off our shores. We should demand of Mr. Khrushchev, who is really in control of Cuba, rather than Mr. Castro, that he remove the Soviet forces, including personnel, armaments, and equipment, by a fixed date. If he refuses to remove the Soviet forces by a fixed date, it is my suggestion that the United States should sever diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and that the Organization of American States should do likewise. If that should be done, I feel that Mr. Khrushchev might change his mind. It is my thought that Mr. Khrushchev would not want the biggest spy headquarters in the world closed; namely, the Russian Embassy in Washington; and that he would not want his other spy headquarters closed; namely, the Russian Embassies in Central and South America. However, if such demands failed to get results, then we should apply a naval and air blockade to Cuba in order to bring the Soviets to their knees.

It has been said that such action might be regarded as an act of war. Possibly it could be considered as such. But, Mr. President, it is my feeling that we cannot permit the Soviets to remain so close to our shores, because that jeopardizes the safety of this country, as well as that of the countries of Central America, of the countries of South America, and of the remainder of the free world. Furthermore, Soviet presence in Cuba provides for the Soviets a base for subversion.

If either of the suggestions I have made does not bring results, then we should not delay longer, but should turn this matter over to the military, in order that the Soviets can be forced out of Cuba.

It is my feeling that we have not been as strong on this matter as we should.

Last fall, when the President demanded that Khrushchev remove the Russian missiles from Cuba, I took occasion to praise the President of the United States; and I was pleased to praise the President for that action. I may say that at the time I was in Brazil, and that action by the President of the United States brought a favorable reaction on the part of the delegates from various free countries of the world who were attending the Interparliamentary Union meeting there.

However, since then, the situation has worsened, in my opinion; and we are now in a position where we cannot permit the present situation to continue. I feel that we must take action; and the quicker we take it, the better for the United States and for the entire free world.

Again, Mr. President, as I have stated, I believe we have here an excellent report; and again I commend the chair-

man of the subcommittee for his splendid work in connection with this interim report.

In closing, I would like to associate myself with the distinguished Senator from Washington in his laudatory remarks about Mr. McCone.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from South Carolina, and I also thank him for his fine work.

Mr. President, in reference to Mr. McCone, the Director of the CIA, in my opinion he is very capable, very able, and, of course, highly dedicated and alert. He gave us the fullest cooperation, and he was fully frank to the committee. I could not find anything lacking.

I also wish to emphasize that the holding of a hearing on a major intelligence problem is a very delicate matter which should be handled with the utmost caution. I do not think representatives of this agency should be called in for an accounting every few days, or that any small so-called error should be magnified. Of course errors are made. One of the most revealing matters about which we were informed was the difficulty of properly evaluating intelligence. It comes from thousands of places all over the world, and is mostly chaff. That is a very, very difficult and highly important undertaking.

Mr. President, before I conclude, I should like to express briefly my personal views and convictions about the tragic Cuban situation. In doing so, I wish to make clear that I speak only for myself, not for the other subcommittee members, who, of course, will speak for themselves.

I have long said that the invasion of the Western Hemisphere by the forces of godless communism is the gravest and most serious of all the challenges and threats now confronting the United States. Our very survival may depend upon the prompt and proper solution of this problem.

Aside from the military threat—much as we may debate the size and quality of the military power which is currently maintained by the Soviets in Cuba—one conclusion is sure, certain, and inescapable: It is that Fidel Castro—aided, supported, and bolstered by his Soviet masters and their military might—is in every way possible spurring, supporting, and abetting the efforts of the Communists and other revolutionary elements to subvert, overthrow, and seize control of the governments of Latin America. It is with this in mind that we must assess the value to Khrushchev of his Cuban vassalage.

We know that it is Soviet Russia and world communism which is the real enemy in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America. We know that it is the Kremlin which is calling the shots in this grim and unhappy drama and which is using Cuba for the furtherance and exploitation of its own sinister aims and ambitions.

Therefore, I am convinced that the number one priority of our national and foreign policy should and must be the complete removal of all Russians from

Cuba and the adoption of a firm and hard plan which once and for all will rid our hemisphere of this threat.

To those who say that this involves risks and the danger of a nuclear war, I reply that there comes a time—as there did last October—when risks must be taken in order to protect and preserve our vital national interests. The risks of doing nothing—of allowing this Communist threat to fester and grow and perhaps to subvert nations after nations—are infinitely greater.

We must make it crystal clear over and over again to all the world that the principles of our historic Monroe Doctrine are still part and parcel of our national policy, and that, regardless of the risks, we are not prepared to abandon it now. We must continue to demonstrate, by deed as well as by word, that we are determined to prevent, either in Cuba or elsewhere in the Americas, the creation or use of any externally supported military capability which endangers our security or that of the Western Hemisphere.

I close by pointing out again that this is an interim report. The subcommittee will continue its surveillance with reference to this problem, and will try to develop further facts in connection with it.

Mr. President, the Senator from Montana has asked that I yield to him.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am sorry that I did not have an opportunity to read all the details of the speech of the Senator from Mississippi; but I was especially interested in the summary of major findings, 14 in number. If the Senator from Mississippi is willing to permit me to do so, I should like to make some comments and to ask some questions.

Mr. STENNIS. I shall be glad to have the Senator from Montana do so.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am delighted to know, for example, that the inquiry has not yet been completed; also, that many of the recommendations which are made at this time are based on information which has been furnished in large part by the intelligence community headed by John McCone, the head of the CIA. I should like to join the other members of the committee who have expressed their great admiration for Mr. McCone and for the devotion to duty which he has displayed, not only in the position he now holds, but also in the positions of trust and confidence he has previously held in the Government of the United States.

I note that the first of the major findings, as summarized, is as follows:

1. While hindsight shows that the performance of the Central Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence agencies can be criticized in some areas, in other areas they performed creditably. Offensive weapons systems were identified before becoming operational and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out in a limited period of time despite adverse weather and an almost completely closed society.

I believe that is a fair statement, although I point out that so far as even intelligence agencies are concerned, we must allow a margin for error.

tions. It has reached certain conclusions, but it has made no recommendations, because this is an interim report; it is not a final report. The subcommittee intends to keep its eyes on this problem for a long time to come.

Secondly, it is very clear that one of the conclusions is, as the Senator from Mississippi has pointed out, that this operation gives the Soviets a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. That it is a problem that we must consider. We must keep it actively in our minds, and be alive to it.

Thirdly, I point out that by unanimous agreement, the subcommittee did not go into the question of the past. It determined that it was a matter for the Preparedness Subcommittee to consider, that the subcommittee had to look forward; that what was past was past; and that we had to start with the facts we now find and that we had to work forward to the best possible advantage.

I point out those three things, because I know the subcommittee was unanimous in reaching the conclusion that it should not make any recommendations, and also that it should not at this time go into the questions of the past.

I congratulate the Senator from Mississippi on the effort that he put into the report, and the great energy he used in persuading the subcommittee to be unanimous on the subject. I thank the Senator from Mississippi, and I appreciate the fact that the Senator from Missouri gave me this opportunity to make these remarks.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator, and again express my great appreciation for his very fine work and cooperation.

The Senator has made reference to the past. Does he refer to the Bay of Pigs operation?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. That is correct.

Mr. STENNIS. I should now like to yield to the Senator from Missouri, who had previously asked me to yield to him.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I wish to join the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from Washington in commending the able chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee. He has done excellent work in the preparation of the report. I commend also his staff. The American people will be very glad to receive these facts with respect to what actually transpired in those critical days last fall.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Missouri for the fine contribution in connection with the report and his wise counsel.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator, and join in commending the very able Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. McCone. As Senators know, I was eager to see him confirmed for this position, because of his extraordinary management capacity, as so well demonstrated in private business and in Government in the past.

Unfortunately, Mr. McCone's intuition, was not reflected in the actions of the Air Force and the other departments which have to do with our intelligence, because, again unfortunately, although Mr. McCone also wisely told his own or-

ganization about his apprehensions, that information was not passed on to the intelligence apparatus. Therefore, there could be no criticism of the President or the intelligence apparatus for not having acted on such information. I have been assured that will not occur again.

We know Mr. McCone was whipping together a new organization, and from this time forward I am sure that the people in his agency will be very desirous of promptly transferring his thoughts, not only to the Department of Defense and the Department of State, but also to the Joint Intelligence Board and to the President of the United States.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Missouri yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield. Mr. JACKSON. We must conform to the rules of propriety. I should like to comment on to whom and on what dates in August Mr. McCone passed on his apprehensions.

In response to the Senator's statement, if he will refer to the hearing transcript, he will find an answer to this matter.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am sure we understand each other. I believe it is fair to say that my information was confirmed by what Mr. McCone said to me. I discussed this subject with Mr. McCone; and I have already mentioned it on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. JACKSON. If the Senator from Missouri will refer to the transcript of the testimony on March 12, he will find the answer to this matter he has raised. I do not believe it is proper for me to discuss this question on the floor of the Senate; therefore, I shall let the Records stand in that regard.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Mississippi yield?

Mr. STENNIS. Had the Senator from Missouri finished?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Again, I express my appreciation for the fine report submitted by the very able Senator from Mississippi with respect to this most important subject. I now ask him this question: Regardless of what we have done in the past, does he not agree that the presence of large Soviet forces in Cuba, at least from the standpoint of the development of subversion in Central and South America, constitutes a menace to the security of the United States?

Mr. STENNIS. I heartily agree. The report in effect so states, even though we did not spell out the details on that point to as great an extent as we could have done. Before I yield the floor I shall have some personal remarks to make, which partly cover that point.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Mississippi yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. I neglected in my remarks to say what is obvious, although I do not believe it needs to be said on the floor of the Senate, because it has been said so many times. As usual, the chairman of the subcommittee, the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Stennis), has performed a commendable duty in accordance with his customary faithful sense of fairness. He has done so with great effort and much diligence.

I associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Symington) and other Senators concerning the outstanding work which the Senator from Mississippi has done and is doing in connection with this all-important investigation.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Washington for his fine cooperation.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Mississippi yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Arizona, who is a relatively new member of the subcommittee and is making a fine contribution to its work.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank the Senator from Mississippi. I warmly wished to pay my respects to the chairman for the careful work he has done and is doing as chairman of the subcommittee. I wish also to pay my respects and offer my thanks to the competent staff, who make it so easy to serve on the subcommittee.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Arizona on behalf of the staff and myself.

Mr. GOLDWATER. The subcommittee has submitted a good report. It is factual and truthful. It will give the American people confidence in the Central Intelligence Agency, although all of us must admit that none of us is perfect. I believe that in this particular case the package developed by the Central Intelligence Agency was a good intelligence package. Anyone who reads the report will have to agree with that statement. Also, anyone who reads the report will have to agree that there was an error in judgment somewhere. We cannot point the finger, nor can we select the spot.

I emphasize what the Senator from Washington (Mr. Jackson) said about Mr. McCone. Mr. McCone is competent in judgment. I believe he did a good job. He was constantly aware of what was occurring after about July of last year. If my memory serves me correctly, he was in touch with his office, even though he was in Europe while the disturbances were taking place in Cuba. So there was no lack of interest on the part of Mr. McCone. He kept on top of the situation, as I have earlier related, because the report shows that the situation was well understood. But somewhere along the line, in my estimation, there was a breakdown.

Again, I thank the chairman for yielding to me and for the privilege I have to serve with him on this important committee.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Arizona for his remarks and for his very fine cooperation throughout the hearings and in the preparation of the report.

Mr. President, I now yield to the distinguished Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Russell), who is a new member of the committee this year. He was of great assistance during the hearings and cooperated in a splendid way. He has made a distinct contribution to the report.

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Cuba. Another 4,000 to 5,000 Soviets have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelligence people say. However, despite this, they have not changed their estimate of 17,500. This indicates to the subcommittee, at the least, a low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is also some doubt in our minds as to the adequacy of information on the number of newly arriving Soviets. The intelligence chiefs agree that there is no evidence that any of the combat ground troops associated with the four mobile armored groups have been withdrawn.

I wish to make one comment about the figure of 17,500 Soviet troops in Cuba and the intelligence that 4,000 or 5,000 have been withdrawn since the first of this calendar year, when in the same sentence it is said that they have not changed their estimate of the figure of 17,500. That statement is difficult to understand on the surface, but I think it is partly explained by the fact, as I understand, that the figure 17,500 is not a firm figure, whereas the figure of 4,000 to 5,000 believed to have been withdrawn is a firm figure.

Bearing in mind the lack of hard evidence on the question and the substantial underestimation of last fall, we conclude that no one in official U.S. sources can tell, with any real degree of confidence, how many Russians are now in Cuba. We feel that the official 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure. Other sources—primarily refugee and exile groups—estimate that as many as 40,000 Soviets are now in Cuba.

In any event, it is conceded that the combined Soviet and Cuban forces now in the island are quite powerful defensively and could offer severe opposition to any attack. These Communist forces have an extensive and quite numerous array of modern weapons, including some of the latest types in the Soviet arsenal. They are admittedly capable of suppressing any internal rebellion or revolt mounted without external support. It is clear that an invasion from without, to have a fair chance of success, would require large forces, extensive sea-borne landing efforts, and adequate air cover.

I think it is fair to say, too, that these Soviet soldiers there, particularly the hard, armored units, could control Castro, too.

Thus, as the interim report points out, aside from the threat which Cuba presents militarily and as a base for subversive activities, the continued presence of the Soviet forces in Cuba is a most effective shield against either internal revolt or invasion by external forces. The ringing of the island by the Soviet air defense and missile systems, and the islandwide evidence of impressive, powerful, armored Russia troop units, all apparently immune from attack, is a psychological damper to the fires of revolt. We can only expect, under existing conditions, that whatever capacity and will to resist communism which now exists among the people of Cuba will further wither and shrink at time goes by.

I would like to emphasize, Mr. President, that in preparing its interim report

the subcommittee was fully conscious of its obligation to make the pertinent facts available to the public to the maximum extent possible. No facts have been withheld except those which might compromise or jeopardize our intelligence operations and activities or otherwise give aid and comfort to our enemies.

We have set forth the facts in as concise, orderly, and logical manner as possible. We hope that this report, and any subsequent reports on this subject which the subcommittee may issue, will be useful and valuable both in spotlighting the activities with respect to Cuba and in meeting the basic right of the people of the United States to be fully informed.

I have only a few personal remarks to make before I yield the floor, but first I wish to say a special word about my very strong and deep feeling, official and personally, for the members of the subcommittee, and the very fine way in which they worked on this subject, and their interest and zeal and firm purpose in having a worthwhile report submitted, as far as it could go, and that it be accurate and to the point.

Not the slightest element of partisanship or political consideration has entered into the treatment of this subject.

The Senator from Washington has asked me to yield to him, because he has a pressing matter to attend to. I will yield to him first, and make my personal remarks later.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. I wished to call attention to a matter that I believe—and I am sure the chairman of the subcommittee will agree—is a very important part of the inquiry made by the subcommittee.

I refer, of course, to the deep concern of the subcommittee in its inquiry with respect to the placing in Cuba of offensive ballistic missiles. I believe the record should disclose, so that the American people will fully understand, that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. John McCone, had predicted, as early as August, that the unusual activity then underway by the Soviets in relation to Cuba indicated to him that one thing they could be up to was the placement of ballistic missiles in Cuba. This information was brought to the attention of the committee on March 12, 1963, when Mr. McCone testified. Am I correct?

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct. Mr. McCone said he based that tentative conclusion on intuition.

Mr. JACKSON. I will read from the censored part of the testimony. It is also my understanding that he was the only one in the intelligence community who had come to this conclusion early in August. The record, I believe, will so disclose.

Mr. STENNIS. The chairman, of course, could not be certain about it. So far as he knows, that is correct.

Mr. JACKSON. I should like to read a part of the censored testimony, taken on March 12, 1963. It has been cleared for release. It is a very brief excerpt, and I will not detain the Senator for long. To read:

Senator JACKSON. As a matter of fact, Mr. McCone, as I recall, either in the previous meeting or in the place else, it was my recollection that you were one of the first to suspect, based on judgment on your part, that the Soviets might put in missiles, MR-10's or DR-10's, in Cuba.

Mr. McCONE. That is correct; that is correct.

Senator JACKSON. Would you just elaborate on that a little.

Mr. McCONE. Yes.

We detected the movement of, without movement—

Senator JACKSON. What was that date?

Mr. McCONE. Well, I am speaking now of late July and early August—we detected an unusual movement of men and material of an unidentified nature in the direction of Cuba in late July, and it started to arrive in August. I came to the conclusion that the only explanation was, let us say one of the explanations of this unusual movement would be, that they were preparing to place offensive missiles in Cuba, and I so reported my view on August 18.

I had no hard intelligence.

Senator JACKSON. This was a matter of your intuitive judgment.

Mr. McCONE. This was a matter of judgment. I had no hard intelligence.

I left on August 23, and I was gone until the 24th of September.

I instructed CIA to put out a daily special report on intelligence findings, and they started it on August 24, and continued it until September 19, at which they thought it was duplicative of other information carried in our regular bulletin. I emphasize that there was no hard intelligence to support my position.

Admittedly, I could reach no other conclusion. I couldn't understand why these surface-to-air missile sites were there, so useless for protecting the island against invasion.

They must be there, in my opinion, to shield the island against observation from aerial reconnaissance.

That is a quotation from the censored testimony of March 12.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I now wish to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts, who has a pressing engagement elsewhere.

Mr. JACKSON. I wish the Record to show that Mr. McCone foresaw what was later to be developed. I believe he deserves great credit for making this information known.

Mr. STENNIS. We can come back to this point later. I wish to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts now, because he has a pressing engagement elsewhere.

Mr. BALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator's yielding to me. I agree with what the Senator from Washington has said about Mr. McCone. I have a very high regard for him. If the Senator from Missouri, who is on his feet, will permit me to do so, I should like to make only a brief statement, because I really must keep an engagement elsewhere, but at the same time I do not want to disappoint him.

Mr. STENNIS. Of course I am glad to defer to my distinguished friend from Massachusetts.

Mr. BALTONSTALL. I appreciate the Senator's courtesy.

With reference to the report the Senator from Mississippi has presented, it is very important to emphasize that the subcommittee has made no recommendation.

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has depended on the estimates furnished him by Mr. McCone and others.

I was interested in the opinion expressed in point 11 relative to how high or how low the number of Soviet technicians and troops in Cuba are.

Point 12 is very interesting because in that paragraph appears the statement: They—

Meaning the Soviet-Cuban forces—are admittedly capable of suppressing any internal rebellion or revolt mounted without external support, and it is clear that an invasion from without, to have a fair chance of success, would require large forces, extensive airborne landing efforts, and adequate air cover.

It is clear that an invasion from without, to have a fair chance of success, would require, first, large forces; second, extensive airborne landing efforts; third, adequate airpower.

I would add one further stipulation:

Fourth, time, because those situations cannot be mounted overnight. It takes time.

I am impressed with what the committee said in points 12 and 14.

I think the committee has done a meritorious job. The committee has done an honest job. It has done a straightforward job. The thanks of the Senate are due to the committee for the fairness, integrity, and understanding it has shown.

Mr. STENNIS. We thank the Senator from Montana very much for his fine and generous remarks on the work of the subcommittee, as well as his analysis of the points that were raised.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. KEATING. Since I am not a member of the committee, I have not engaged in this debate. As the Senator from Mississippi knows, I have had an interest in this subject.

I wish to express to the Senator from Mississippi and to the other members of his fine committee my gratification over the report. I commend them for the very careful way they have approached the task which was entrusted to them. I have just seen the report. It seems to be well and carefully prepared, which is typical of the work we have come to know the distinguished Senator from Mississippi engages in. The same is true with respect to the other members of the committee.

I wish to express my gratification particularly, as the Senator from Mississippi has, because of the fact that this is a unanimous report. There has been no tinge of partisanship or special interest entering into the preparation of it. Perhaps I can be pardoned for saying I am greatly heartened by the findings of the committee.

I join in the expressions of praise for Mr. McCone. It has been my observation that he has performed a fine service, and that there were times during this difficult period when the man on the street was often saying, "This is the fault of the CIA." This report clearly

demonstrates that that was not an accurate assessment, and I am happy that the committee so found.

I wish to add one word about the so-called numbers game, since my name was brought in by the distinguished majority leader. In that connection, as I am sure the distinguished majority leader realizes, I said there was no merit in engaging in a "numbers game" which is exactly the same thing the President of the United States said.

As to the troops in Cuba, if there are 12,000 or 13,000, which is the lowest estimate anybody has given, that is 12,000 or 13,000 too many. The committee has said so in the report. I believe that most people are agreed on that point.

I think the committee has performed a great service for our Nation, and is entitled to the highest praise.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator very much on behalf of the subcommittee. I thank him especially for myself, too. The Senator from New York has made a real contribution in this difficult field. I consulted with the Senator about the hearings at the beginning, and he made some helpful suggestions.

Mr. SALTOWSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTOWSTALL. I agree with the Senator from New York that the Senator from Mississippi and other members of the committee—helping him, I hope—have done their best to bring out the facts, so far as they could find them up to the present time.

As I said before to the Senator from Mississippi, we have very clearly not made any recommendations, because we did not think it was the time to make recommendations.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. SALTOWSTALL. I think the most important fact which is brought out in the report and the conclusions to be derived from it is the fact that the Russians have established a foothold in the Western Hemisphere, and that is something which has to be constantly in our minds, to make sure that the proper steps are taken to get them out of the hemisphere, if we can, and, in any event, to make sure that every step we take is a step in the interest of our own security.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, has the report now been officially released?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. There is a "Secret" copy of the report with the Committee on Armed Services and of course with the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. It is classified as "Secret," and necessarily so. It is open to any Member of the Senate or of the House at those places. We think it is better not to take it out.

There is an edited copy which has now gone to the public and to the press. It went to the press this morning at about 9:30. That will be printed. It is now

mimeographed, but it will be printed as soon as the Printing Office can take care of that job.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The copy I have, styled as "interim report" by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, is "for release"?

Mr. STENNIS. That is correct.

Mr. DIRKSEN. That is what the Senator refers to as the presently released copy, rather than the report itself?

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct. That is the so-called sanitized version of the report. In other words, it has been cleared by the CIA itself and by the Department of Defense as being permissible for publication.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It is fair to assume that, if this is an interim report, there will be a subsequent report.

Mr. STENNIS. That is the expectation of the committee. We expect to continue a surveillance over this subject for any possible developments. This does complete the intelligence part, up until now.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The report itself—not the interim press release, but the report itself—still has the imprint of classification on it?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. DIRKSEN. And is available only to Members of the Senate?

Mr. STENNIS. Or to Members of the House. It will be in the committee rooms, as I said, available at any time.

Mr. DIRKSEN. That clarifies the situation.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. President, I shall complete my remarks in about 5 more minutes.

I wish to thank, as well as commend, the members of the staff of the subcommittee who have worked so hard, both day and night, as well as on some holidays, preparing for the hearings and conducting them, and preparing the report.

I wish to single out two James T. Kendall, chief counsel, and Samuel R. Shaw, a U.S. Marine Corps general, who has been with us, for their especially fine and highly valuable work.

In the talk I made, I frequently used the term "intelligence community." I read now briefly a definition of that term, as carried in the report itself. I think it should be reflected in the RECORD:

Broadly speaking, the term "intelligence community" includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is used in this report, however, in a somewhat more limited sense. Where the term appears in this report it primarily refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Other agencies are, of course, impliedly included in our use of the term to the extent that they participated in or contributed to any of the activities or operations discussed.

That definition refers to the term "intelligence community" which I used.